Is Pakistan truly involved in cross-border terrorism with India? Does it have the capacity to orchestrate such operations today, like it may have in the 1990s? More importantly, does it have anything to gain from it in the current geopolitical climate? Or is this just another convenient narrative used by Indian politicians to deflect domestic discontent and fuel populist nationalism?
Let’s start by flipping the mirror. Imagine these same questions pointed at India: Does India interfere in Pakistan’s internal affairs? Has it supported militant groups inside Pakistan? Has it politically benefited from anti-Pakistan rhetoric?
The answers become uncomfortable when you examine them closely. But first, let’s dismantle the myth that Pakistan is a mastermind of modern cross-border terrorism.
Can Pakistan Afford a Conflict with India?
Pakistan is not what it was in the 1990s. Today, it is a state gripped by economic collapse, political disarray, and internal power struggles. The military is locked in a silent standoff with a defiant public standing behind Imran Khan, the chief of PTI, that no longer tolerates its decades-long interference in civilian politics. Even after manipulating elections and propping up pliant parties like the PML-N and PPP, it has failed to regain control over public sentiment.
The appointment of the current Army Chief, General Asim Munir, speaks volumes. His ascension was prematurely announced not by the military, nor by the Prime Minister, but by Maryam Nawaz Sharif—the daughter of Nawaz Sharif who held no official position at the time. The premature announcement of General Asim Munir’s appointment as Army Chief by Maryam Nawaz—despite holding no official position—was not just a breach of protocol, but a clear indication of collusion between the Sharif family and the military establishment. His selection was driven by personal loyalty, not merit, which is precisely why Asim Munir now appears willing to go to any extent to protect the Sharif family’s interests and keep them in power.
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Amid this chaos, how could Pakistan possibly run a coherent external operation against a neighbor six times its size, both militarily and economically?
Who’s Really Peddling Hate?
Hatred against India doesn’t sell in Pakistan anymore. One can hardly recall mainstream Pakistani politicians weaponizing anti-India sentiment to win elections. But in India? Anti-Pakistan rhetoric is a political goldmine.
From campaign stages to TV debates, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and senior BJP leaders cannot go two minutes without invoking Pakistan. It is not just a political tool—it is a ritual. Pakistan has become a scapegoat for nearly every national crisis: inflation, protests, farmer unrest, and even cinema bans.
This carefully curated external enemy plays directly into India’s rising tide of Hindutva nationalism. And it works.
Indian Footprints in Pakistan?
Let’s talk facts. Pakistan has real grievances. The most glaring example: Kulbhushan Jadhav—an Indian naval officer caught in Balochistan and accused of coordinating terrorist acts in Karachi and elsewhere. His confession, broadcast nationally, detailed his role in destabilizing Pakistan. India claims it was coerced, but international arbitration by the International Court of Justice didn’t exonerate him either—only granted consular access. His case remains a diplomatic wound between the two countries.
More recently, Pakistan has accused India of funding the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a group responsible for multiple terrorist attacks in Balochistan. These aren’t vague accusations—they are backed by arrests, confessions, and even video testimonies. If these acts had been committed by groups linked to Pakistan in India, New Delhi would have called it an act of war.
Kashmir: The Silence that Speaks Volumes
Gone are the days when Kashmir defined Pakistan’s foreign policy. When India revoked Article 370, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its special constitutional status, the Pakistan Army—once vocal and assertive on Kashmir—remained disturbingly silent. There was no meaningful retaliation, no diplomatic escalation, and no mobilization of international support. It was Imran Khan, the Prime Minister at the time, who took a firm stand—halting all forms of trade with India and raising the Kashmir issue vocally on international platforms, including the United Nations.
Why?
Because the military establishment no longer sees Kashmir as a viable battlefield—it sees it as a political liability. But that doesn’t mean it wants peace either. Low-intensity tension with India is its last remaining justification for monopolizing resources, budgets, and political leverage inside Pakistan.
The Balakot Episode: A Lesson in Restraint?
The 2019 Balakot airstrike was a turning point in South Asia’s military tensions. While India claimed to target terrorist camps, Pakistan’s swift and firm response—downing Indian jets and capturing a pilot—was driven not by the military, but by the decisive leadership of then Prime Minister Imran Khan. In stark contrast, during a recent episode of Indian aggression, including drone and missile strikes on Pakistani soil and military sites, the Army remained silent for three days. Only after mounting public pressure and continued Indian attacks did it react—reactively, not strategically. This delay exposes deeper cracks in Pakistan’s power structure, where today’s military seems more focused on crushing domestic dissent than defending national sovereignty. Without assertive civilian leadership, as seen under Imran Khan, national security suffers.
Final Thoughts
So, is Pakistan planning terrorism in India? The evidence is thin, circumstantial at best, and often recycled. But what’s clear is that India finds political utility in keeping that narrative alive.
The real question is not about Pakistan’s intent—but India’s BJP’s need. As long as the myth of a terrorist Pakistan helps win elections, silences dissent, and distracts from domestic failures, it will persist. But myths, like regimes built on hate, do not last forever.
Dr. Inayat Ali is a senior researcher based in South Korea. He holds a Ph.D. in Engineering and has authored over fifteen peer-reviewed international publications and patents in advanced technological fields. Originally from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), a region affected by conflict and instability, Dr. Inayat keeps a strong intellectual interest in geopolitics and regional security.